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INTRODUCTION: WHO WANTS TO ACT?
Who really wants to do it? Since the Brexit referendum in the UK and the publication
of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) in June 2016, there has been a flurry of proposals
by Member States to deepen defence cooperation in the context of the EU. Most
notable among these were two Franco-German papers, first by the two foreign and
then by the two defence ministers, and a proposal by the French, German, Italian and
Spanish defence ministers. Most notable, because without both France and Germany
involved, no initiative can reach the scale to make it worthwhile. And because if
France, Germany, Italy and Spain would go ahead and do it, that would create the
kind of momentum necessary to make it work.
“It” would be Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The Franco-German-
Italian-Spanish paper sees this unused provision of the Lisbon Treaty as “a funda-
mental instrument”. It would allow for the creation of a smaller group (which can
mean any number below twenty-eight), of Member States “whose military capabili-
ties fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one
another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions”, and who would
cooperate “within the Union framework” (Art. 42.6 TEU). The Protocol on PESCO
annexed to the Treaty lists five broad commitments participating Member States
have to make:
1. To agree on the level of investment in defence equipment;
2. To “bring their defence apparatus into line with each other as far as possible”, by
harmonizing military needs, pooling, and specialization;
3. To enhance their forces’ availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability,
notably by setting “common objectives regarding the commitment of forces”;
4. To address the commonly identified capability shortfalls, including through multi-
national approaches;
5. To take part in equipment projects in the context of the European Defence
Agency (EDA).
The Treaty also assigns to the EDA the task of assessing whether these binding
commitments are met.
So far however, nobody has done “it”, and it is still not clear that anybody will. Yes,
the Foreign Affairs Council (14 November 2016) adopted extensive conclusions on
the implementation of the EUGS in the field of security and defence. The result, as all
involved kept repeating, of 19 hours of negotiations in the Political and Security
Committee, these conclusions produced a self-congratulatory mood in the Brussels
bubble. There is real progress, such as the creation of “a permanent operational
planning and conduct capability at the strategic level for non-executive military
missions”, envisaged in the first half of 2017. Now that the Member States agree, the2
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Member States would have to implement, the Council conclusions are far less
concrete. And since all military capabilities are Member State capabilities, this means
that in reality it is as yet far from certain that any initiative generating real additional
capability will see the light.
The EU level has done what it can. The EU can exhort, facilitate, and incentivise, as it
has done in the past. Indeed, without the title page, it is difficult to distinguish the
wording on defence cooperation in EU documents today from, for example, the
European Council Conclusions of December 2013 – and one could cite much earlier
documents. This is not to say that nothing can happen – just to make it absolutely
clear that on the most crucial aspect, i.e. delivering capability, more or less
everything still has to happen. And that it better happen now.
The good news is that PESCO is back on the agenda at least. For in 2010, when it was
first discussed, the Belgian Presidency discovered that its many ideas on how to
activate PESCO hit an unbreachable wall of Member States doubting whether it
should be activated at all.1 Ever since, PESCO has been seen as toxic – until today. It
seems that the combination of three powerful agents, Putin, Brexit, and Trump, has
started the decontamination process. The Franco-German-Italian-Spanish paper
states that “we should consider a PESCO”, and the November Foreign Affairs Council
said as much. So did the European Council of 15 December 2016, concluding that
“the High Representative will present proposals in the coming months as regards […]
elements and options for an inclusive Permanent Structured Cooperation based on
a modular approach and outlining possible projects”.
In 2017 we will know soon enough therefore who is willing to enter into PESCO. But
before Member States can make up their mind, we will need to specify which objec-
tives PESCO is actually supposed to achieve.
1 For a review of the 2010 debate see: Sven Biscop and Jo Coelmont, “CSDP and the Ghent Framework: The
Indirect Approach to Permanent Structured Cooperation?”, in European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 16, No.
2 (2011), p. 149-167.3
WHY TO ACT
The problem is that Member States have been unwilling to seriously discuss the
military level of ambition. Moreover the structures make it very difficult to discuss
the overall European rather than a separate EU and NATO level of ambition. Yet if
Member States seek to integrate their single set of forces through PESCO, the
resulting force package must enable them to meet all their commitments, so the
debate cannot focus on the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) alone.
On the EU side, the EUGS defines three sets of military tasks. The first, protecting
Europe, can imply operations on Europe’s borders, but also safeguarding sea lines of
communication worldwide. The second, capacity-building, can entail long-term
efforts in several neighbouring countries, but also military cooperation with partners
such as ASEAN, especially in the maritime area. Finally, responding to (or preventing)
crises may require more than one long-term stabilization operation, of at least
brigade-size, in the neighbourhood, without forgetting that the EUGS also mentions
contributing to worldwide UN peacekeeping. But it can also mean a high-intensity
crisis management operation of several brigades and/or squadrons in the neighbour-
hood. These scenarios may occur simultaneously, so a high degree of concurrency is
inevitable. Furthermore, the EUGS states that in these areas the EU must achieve
strategic autonomy or, as the December 2016 European Council put it: “The
European Union and its Member States must be able to […] act autonomously when
and where necessary and with partners wherever possible”.
Implementing the EUGS within the existing EU military level of ambition is simply not
possible. This demands more forces than the Headline Goal that the EU set in 1999,
i.e. the ability to deploy, and to sustain for at least one year, up to an army corps
(60,000 troops) and concomitant air and naval forces. To make things worse, EU
Member States cannot even deploy this number for any longer period of time, unless
the US provides the bulk of the strategic enablers. And they count on the availability
of US forces and US political will to act as a strategic reserve as well, even though the
reality is that with the election of Donald Trump as President of the US that political
will may evaporate very fast. Contrary to good military practice however, EU
Member States have insufficient capabilities to have as many troops in reserve as
they deploy in case an operation goes awry. Clearly, the EUGS has implicitly
increased the EU level of ambition.
Everybody knows this, but nobody officially wants to say it. Member States have not
been willing to draw the logical conclusion and open the Headline Goal for discus-
sion. In its November 2016 conclusions, the Council “tasks to review the military
requirements stemming from the EUGS and the level of ambition”. But while the
conclusions do include a section entitled “Level of Ambition”, that does no more than
illustrate the three tasks set by the EUGS with examples of operations, without any4
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annex, that the EU should be capable to do all of this “based on previously agreed
goals and commitments”, defined in a footnote as: the existing Headline Goal.
Nevertheless, there is margin for manoeuvre. Although the Council did not explicitly
mention it, a month later the European Council did restate the EUGS aim for the EU
to be able to act autonomously. That means that even within the existing Headline
Goal, more strategic enablers are needed. And in reality it also means that the EU has
to go beyond the 60,000, because Europe will have to have its own reserves as well.
Moreover, the day Brexit happens, the British contribution, which amounts to a full
20%, will have to be deducted from the EU’s Force Catalogue (of capabilities that
Member States have already listed as available on a case-by-case basis). Of course,
British forces will not disappear, and when Europeans decide to launch operations,
in whichever framework (the CSDP, NATO, the UN, or ad hoc), the UK is more likely
to be part of the action then not. But for the purpose of stepping up the EU effort, it
is better to discount them, so that even if the current Headline Goal is maintained,
the remaining EU Member States must contribute more in order to fill the gaps left
by the UK – and in the end, the overall sum of deployable forces of the EU27+1 will
be bigger than it is today.
When reviewing EU military requirements, “ensuring coherence of outcomes and
timelines with the NATO Defence Planning Process” (NDPP), as the Council explicitly
added to the tasking, is crucial. The NDPP translates what the Alliance as a whole,
including the non-EU Allies, should be capable of into capability targets for every
individual Ally. It does not attempt to ensure that the sum of the capabilities held by
the Allies (and partners) that are EU Member States alone constitutes a coherent
force package, capable of operations without having recourse to assets of the others.
And so it is not. The US especially contributes much more than its share of strategic
enablers – and President Trump is widely expected to continue to rub that in. So the
spread of capabilities resulting from the NDPP as it works today does not guarantee
EU strategic autonomy. But if the next iteration of the NDPP can incorporate a clearly
defined EU level of ambition, a capability mix can be designed that allows the
Europeans to do all: contributing to collective defence, and undertaking expedi-
tionary operations with the US and the other non-EU Allies or autonomously. Like a
set of Russian dolls, the EU level of ambition for autonomous operations to imple-
ment the EUGS fits into the higher NATO level of ambition, which includes the non-
EU Allies and adds the task of collective defence.
The ambiguous Council conclusions threaten to leave a missing link between the
ambitious wording of the EUGS and any future capability development, including
through PESCO. If the EU will leave it unspecified which and how many strategic
enablers its autonomy requires, to name one of the most crucial aspects, then what
would guide PESCO? This flou artistique can be an opportunity, however, if it is put5
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military requirements and producing the new Capability Development Plan by spring
2018, as tasked by the Council. Then the Member States launching PESCO can decide
which share of the requirements defined by the NDPP and by the EU (for the EU level
of ambition within the NDPP), they will seek to meet through their collective
endeavour. Achieving those targets, the “NDPP/EU”, will demand far-reaching
integration of effort.6
HOW TO ACT
Here looms another risk. In order to make PESCO more palatable, “modular” and
“projects” have become keywords, like in the European Council conclusions. That
PESCO will be modular goes without saying. Not every Member State that joins
PESCO will be expected to contribute to every capability area encompassed by
PESCO, nor therefore to every project launched in the context of PESCO. But PESCO
must be about a lot more than projects to develop or procure equipment. Member
States can already sign up for projects in different constellations today – that is why
the EDA exists. Calling this PESCO will not make any difference.
The real added value of PESCO lies in the second criterion that the Treaty defines:
bringing Member States’ defence apparatus into line with each other. Because until
today they are doing the opposite. States do strictly national defence planning, in
splendid isolation, and without much regard for either the EU or NATO. Possibilities
for cooperation are only explored afterwards, by which time many opportunities are
precluded by the national choices already made. This works – if every State has a
defence budget and troop numbers large enough to maintain full spectrum forces
alone. Which hasn’t been the case for decades now.
PESCO can turn this around. Participating Member States should plan together, as if
for one force, and then decide which contribution every individual State will make.
The aim: to arrive at a single coherent full-spectrum force package that delivers a
significant share of the “NDPP/EU” target. This would make PESCO the core of
European defence: at the same time the European pillar of NATO and the armed
branch of the EU.
Which force package exactly the participants aim at would be the subject of a perma-
nent dialogue, like a permanent capability conference or a “capability-generating
community”,2 which revises and upgrades the target as the means and the “NDPP/
EU” requirements evolve. A permanent dialogue would generate a living chapeau to
guide all activities taking place through PESCO.
Under this chapeau equipment projects can then be launched, notably to acquire the
strategic enablers on which the force will have to rely. But PESCO has to go further
than that: once acquired, strategic enablers should not be divided up among the
States that took part in their development, but operated as a permanent multina-
tional capacity. To that end, we should not just replicate the model of European Air
Transport Command (EATC), as called for by the Council, but improve upon it. EATC
is a single body to manage separate transport fleets; the next logical step would be a
2 Jo Coelmont, Permanent Sovereign Cooperation to Underpin the EU Global Strategy, Brussels, Egmont,
December 2016 (Security Policy Brief No. 80).7
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logistics and training. A European medical command, which Germany always puts
forwards as an example of what PESCO can achieve, would be another valuable
project. But it cannot be the flagship of PESCO, for it would confirm all the prejudices
about German and European unwillingness to engage in “serious” military opera-
tions. More to the point therefore would be European fleets of drones, satellites,
patrol aircraft, and coast guard vessels. And, in the longer term, of the next genera-
tion of fighter aircraft and frigates.
In all of these areas, those participating in PESCO should commit to the development
of a single platform, and they should do so fast, if we want new capabilities to enter
our arsenals in the 2030s (given how long development takes). In this way PESCO can
help ending the wastage of multiple European programmes that compete with each
other – and cannot compete with the US. At the same time, assembled in a “PESCO
fleet” rather than scattered among nations, more capabilities would be readily avail-
able (and even if one contributing State does not want to be a part of a specific
operation, one can organize around that if the fleet is large enough, as EATC has
already proved).
But PESCO should not end even there. As the reference to fighter aircraft and frigates
already indicates, not only strategic enablers can be pooled. In addition, participating
States can build permanent multinational formations with dedicated multinational
headquarters: army corps, air wings, and naval squadrons. To these every participant
would have to contribute national manoeuvre units in the areas of his choice, such
as mechanized battalions, fighter aircraft, or frigates. All the support functions
however can be ensured by a combination of pooling (permanent multinational
units) and specialization (a division of labour among participating countries).3
Obviously, no participant should be allowed to contribute to the support units only:
risk-sharing is vital to make this scheme work. Anchoring the “head”, everybody’s
manoeuvre units, in large multinational frameworks would allow for a major reduc-
tion of the “tail”, which each nation now provides separately. These synergies and
economies of scale would make national defence spending less fragmented, and
release funds for investment in more capability and for actual operations.
The multinational formations established through PESCO should indeed become the
framework of choice to mount European operations, in all frameworks: the CSDP,
NATO (including the multinational forces deployed in the Baltics, for example), the
UN, and coalitions of the willing. From the corps, wing or squadron, tailor-made
forces could be generated in a modular way for any specific operation. Participating
Member States would thus end up doing defence planning, capability development,
3 Belgian-Dutch naval cooperation is an existing example, at a smaller scale, of how this works in practice:
both countries contribute frigates and minehunters sailing under their own flag with their own crew, but
there is only one headquarters and one operational school (pooling), while the Netherlands is in charge of
training, logistics and maintenance for the frigates and Belgium for the minehunters (specialization).8
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would gradually produce more and more alignment in their ways of operating, in
their thinking, and ultimately in their strategic cultures. Unlike today, when nations
sometimes deploy headquarters but rarely if ever actual combat units through the
many existing multinational formations. In which, consequently, the degree of
integration for the most part remains minimal.
PESCO can be used in a constructive manner however to streamline the various other
clusters and frameworks in which the participating Member States also take part. If
(the majority of) their participants are in PESCO, existing clusters of cooperation
could be brought under its chapeau.4 This would create opportunities for widening
and deepening existing formats while ensuring their relevance for the overall level of
ambition. If PESCO is activated, it will also have an impact on the participating
Member States’ cooperation with those who have chosen not to join (yet). A nation
can engage in military cooperation (i.e. render its forces interoperable) with different
sets of nations in different frameworks. But once it integrates its forces with one set
of nations in PESCO (i.e. goes for permanent and far-reaching pooling and specializa-
tion), it cannot integrate them again with another set of nations in another frame-
work. If PESCO is launched, that will be the predominant focus for the participating
States therefore, but of course the PESCO force package as a whole can still
cooperate and be made interoperable with other States and other frameworks.
Through PESCO, smaller Member States would gain relevance. By anchoring more or
less their entire armed forces in various multinational formations, they would be able
to devote a larger share of their defence expenditure to maintaining and deploying
their remaining manoeuvre units, and would thus have a greater say in multinational
decision-making. Larger Member States would have to offer the core of the large
multinational structures, without necessarily having to include all of their own forces
from the start. In return, they would be able to establish the critical mass needed to
acquire the strategic enablers and to maintain the full spectrum forces that their
aspirations still call for but which alone they can no longer afford. At the same time,
PESCO would not mean the end of sovereignty. Because the manoeuvre units within
the multinational formation would remain national, one participant could still
flexibly deploy an infantry battalion, for example, without all others having to follow
suit, as long as everybody’s staff in the support units do their job. In fact, by pooling
all too limited national military sovereignty, PESCO would revive sovereignty, i.e. the
capacity for action, at a higher level.5
All these advantages of military integration have been pointed out by many people
for many years though. What could convince Member States to – finally – do it now?
4 Anne Bakker, Margriet Drent and Dick Zandee, European Defence Core Groups. The Why, What & How of
Permanent Structured Cooperation, The Hague, Clingendael, November 2016 (Policy Brief).
5 Hence the title of Jo Coelmont’s latest publication on the issue – see note 2.9
INCENTIVES TO ACT AND CRITERIA TO TAKE PART
Stepping up cooperation is in the air. Not only is PESCO being discussed, many
nations have also engaged in one of the three groups established under the heading
of NATO’s Framework Nations Concept (FNC). The FNC reads like PESCO under a
different name: the idea is for one or more larger nations to offer the framework,
such as a corps or a headquarters, in which a number of smaller nations plug in with
specific contributions, in order to achieve their NDPP targets together.6 A German
proposal originally, it was never really made clear why Berlin thought NATO rather
than the EU was the better forum to introduce it, or indeed how it thought to make
the FNC compatible with the more recent proposals that it tabled in the EU again.
Nations could choose to use the FNC rather than PESCO as the main framework to
make the leap from cooperation to integration. Of the three FNC groups currently
existing, the German-led one of 16 appears the most promising in this regard, though
it remains to be seen how far participants are really willing to go. Having started out
by focusing on capability development (with sub-groups of various sizes addressing
specific capability areas), it is now also used to generate temporary multinational
deployments, notably to the east in the context of NATO.7 If they opt for the FNC,
Europeans would still have to redefine the level of ambition, of course, in order to
arrive at an “NDPP/EU” that builds their strategic autonomy.
Whichever format is chosen, real integration will eventually demand a legally binding
international agreement between the participating States that codifies who contrib-
utes which capabilities to the planned force package, in order to guarantee that each
will continue to finance his agreed contribution over time, as a safeguard against
national budget cuts. That agreement will also have to define the procedures for
deployment on actual operations. The starting point of cooperation is trust, but
integration requires guarantees. Otherwise, a model like the FNC risks ending up like
the EU’s European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) of the early 2000s: voluntary partic-
ipation in working groups per capability area led only to the voluntary absence of
results. PESCO has the advantage over the FNC that it offers a ready-made legal
framework, within the TEU – the legal base could not be more solid.
Moreover, contrary to when it was first debated, PESCO now also comes with an –
almost – ready-made incentive to join: the European Defence Fund proposed by the
European Commission. That is, if the Commission is prepared to put up half of the €5
6 Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, The Framework Nations Concept and NATO: Game-Changer for a New Strategic Era or
Missed Opportunity?, Rome, NATO Defence College, July 2016 (Research Paper No. 132).
7 A UK-led group of 7 focuses on deployment, through participation by the others in the British Joint Expedi-
tionary Force (JEF). An Italian-led group of 6 focuses on stabilization and reconstruction operations. It
should be noted that France is not now engaged in any FNC group and seems unlikely to shift its main multi-
national capability effort to NATO. And without France, no framework can reach the scale necessary for
success.10
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criteria in the Treaty, i.e. an agreed level of investment, in projects to address the
priority shortfalls, through the EDA, PESCO could be configured to entail an obliga-
tion to contribute to the defence fund. The reward would be that every Euro from
the Member States would be matched by a Euro from the Commission, and that the
fund would be used for capability projects decided upon through PESCO (within the
priority requirements resulting from the “NDPP/EU”). The first set of participating
States would thus have to assemble €2.5 billion, divided according to GDP; that
target could be raised when additional Member States join later. Member States that
remain outside PESCO could have the right to join in any project on a case-by-case
basis, by contributing to its funding.
This “capability window”, as the Commission calls it, is one of two dimensions of the
European Defence Fund. The other will be the “research window”, for which the
Commission plans to provide €500 million per year in the next budgetary period
(post-2020). This will function far more upstream, without a direct link to PESCO, but
it is important that requirements resulting from the “NDPP/EU” guide expenditure,
so that research leads smoothly to development projects that can take place in the
context of PESCO at a later stage. Still under discussion is whether the European
Investment Bank could play a role in defence, which could further increase the avail-
able funds. Furthermore, by discounting all investment, including in defence, when
assessing Member States’ annual budgetary balance, the Commission would greatly
encourage investment and wealth creation.
On the capabilities side, the European Defence Fund is the most concrete outcome
since the December 2013 European Council debated defence – if it materializes as
planned. Then it could be a very powerful incentive to activate PESCO, and to use
PESCO to generate more capabilities rather than just to pool what is there already.
The Fund would be impervious to national budgetary evolutions, and would
guarantee that investment sets the right priorities: those that concern the common
level of ambition. For the participating Member States therefore, contributing to the
Fund would be the most important criterion. More important because it is more
operational and more feasible than the NATO target of spending 2% of GDP on
defence, which has become a fetish that obstructs rather than advances European
defence – and which most nations will never reach.
Because contributing to the European Defence Fund is a feasible criterion, it guaran-
tees the inclusiveness of PESCO, a prerequisite that many Member States have
stressed. Inclusiveness should be understood correctly. It cannot mean that every-
body should just be allowed to join – that would render the instrument useless.
Rather, it means that everybody willing to make the effort to meet the entry criteria
can automatically join, and that those criteria have to be real (entailing a real effort
to do more than today) yet realistic (because proportionate to GDP).11
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overall defence expenditure of the participants in PESCO, but on the degree and the
pace at which they are meeting the capability targets that they have taken upon
themselves, and on the extent to which all opportunities for pooling and specializa-
tion are being exploited and nations are adapting their defence planning to each
other. The November 2016 Foreign Affairs Council invited the High Representative to
present proposals in the spring of 2017 for a “coordinated annual review on
defence”, on a voluntary basis, with exactly this focus. This review could be made
compulsory for those participating in PESCO. The rolling process of defining the
“NDPP/EU” and the annual assessment can be undertaken by the EU Military Staff
and the EDA, though some reinforcement will likely be necessary.
Clearly, all the necessary instruments are at hand – are the Member States ready to
use them now?12
CONCLUSION: IT IS TO BE DONE
Until now, Member States write papers and give speeches about PESCO. Academics
can do that – it doesn’t take a ministry of foreign affairs or defence. Those who really
want to do PESCO now urgently have to come forward, before the window of oppor-
tunity closes again.
If we do PESCO, we have to do it right. Using PESCO as no more than an umbrella
under which to do various procurement projects means to waste PESCO, for Member
States can do that already, via the EDA. Once set on this path, it will be very difficult
to change course. We have already foreclosed the optimal use of the Mutual Defence
Clause (Art. 42.7 TEU) in this way, by activating it (after the 13 November 2015
terrorist attacks in Paris) and then not doing anything that could not have been done
without it.
Doing it right requires first and foremost the right mind-set. Participating Member
States must be willing to exploit all opportunities for pooling and specialization to the
maximum and to adapt their national defence planning to the commonly agreed
capability targets, without any taboos. That also means doing away with any existing
or envisaged national capability that turns out to be redundant. It also implies that
purely national defence industrial interests must give way to multinational priorities
– which will generate multinational economic opportunities. Only a very few of the
many existing bi- and multinational cooperation initiatives have already reached this
stage (and the FNC groups are not among them). And of course, those targets must
be sufficiently ambitious. There is no point in launching PESCO if there is no ambition
to achieve strategic autonomy.
I had the opportunity to be closely involved in the first debate on PESCO, in 2010, and
I am fortunate to be involved again today. I don’t think there will be a third time that
I can write about why we need PESCO: either we do it now or we never will. But I do
hope that I will be able to write about the success of PESCO.13
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